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INTRODUCTION
How can we best reap the benefits of online profiling while avoiding
the privacy pitfalls plaguing the e-commerce community? Experts advo-
cate legislation,' civil litigation,2 or self-regulation to provide the ideal
* J.D., May 2009, The University of Michigan Law School.
1. See, e.g., Andrew Hotaling, Protecting Personally Identifiable Information on the
Internet: Notice and Consent in the Age of Behavioral Targeting, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
529 (2008); Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1193 (1998). The European Union has enacted its own legislative regime to deal with this
issue. See Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
2. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1283 (2000); Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as
Property in the Electronic Wilderness, i BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1 (1996); Richard S. Murphy,
Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381
(1996).
3. See, e.g., LYDIA PARNES, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PREPARED STATEMENT OF
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING BEFORE THE SENATE COM-
MITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION (2008), available at http:ll
www.ftc.gov/os/2008/07/P085400behavioralad.pdf [hereinafter FTC STATEMENT ON BEHAV-
IORAL ADVERTISING].
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solution. Analyzing these proposals reveals a conflict between two basic
principles: the need to preserve personal privacy and the desire to foster
a thriving Internet-based industry. This Note argues that each approach
tends to favor one principle at the expense of the other. This Note also
proposes a new solution which creates incentives for effective self-
regulation backed with legal enforcement. This scheme strikes an appro-
priate balance between privacy and e-commerce principles and brings a
flexible standard to address future innovation.
Tracking a user's Internet activity seems intrusive because compa-
nies can exploit intimate information. For example, Sir Tim Berners-Lee,
inventor of the World Wide Web, worries that searching for books on
cancer could result in increased health insurance premiums because
companies can track consumers' online activity and then sell this infor-
mation to the insurance industry.4 This apprehension will only increase
as technology enables greater data collection and more accurate profil-
ing. For instance, breakthroughs in deep packet inspection have opened
the door to surveillance by Internet Service Providers (ISPs), which can
now track everything a user does online. Advanced processing power
then swiftly sorts this data into individually tailored profiles to be used
or sold at the ISP's will.
At the same time, online profiling brings users considerable prosper-
ity. Credit reporting is cited as one of the best benefits of information
sharing,5 saving consumers "as much as $80 billion a year on mortgage
loans because of the liquidity that credit bureau information makes pos-
sible." 6 Online profiling also creates more advertising opportunities
which then fund much of the content users currently access for free.7
The dilemma posed by online profiling is further discussed in Part I
of this Note, which concludes that the optimal solution to the profiling
problem must prevent privacy harms without smothering e-commerce.
Part II then evaluates solutions which create a private cause of action and
determines that using civil litigation to balance these interests is less than
ideal. Part I examines existing self-regulatory efforts and legislative
options. While self-regulation and legislation offer important advantages,
each solution, by itself, suffers from considerable defects that render a
4. Rory Cellan-Jones, Web Creator Rejects Net Tracking, BBC NEWS, Mar. 17, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/technology/7299875.stm.
5. Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Benefits and Costs of Online Privacy
Legislation, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 85, 106 (2002).
6. Fred H. Cate & Michael E. Staten, Putting People First: Consumer Benefits of In-
formation-Sharing (2000), http:llwww.privacyalliance.org/resources/consumerbenies.pdf
(emphasis omitted) (last visited June 28, 2009) (on file with author).
7. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING MOVING
THE DISCUSSION FORWARD TO POSSIBLE SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES (2007), http://
www.ftc.gov/os/2007/12/P859900stmt.pdf.
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single policy tool unlikely to satisfactorily resolve the profiling dilemma.
Meanwhile, a frenzy of political action over ISP surveillance suggests
that privacy problems are pressing enough to create broad support for
legislation. Part IV proposes a solution to the profiling problem-a
modified legislative approach which incorporates aspects of self-
regulation. It then argues that this solution is ideal because it capitalizes
on existing political momentum to create flexible and functioning stan-
dards that will increase personal privacy and nurture e-commerce.
I. CURRENT PRACTICES AND POLICIES
The Internet currently reaches 72.5 percent of the U.S. population.8
One poll indicates that, "[a]mong those who use the Internet daily, more
than 80 percent use it several times a day and nearly half use it con-
stantly."9 For many, the Internet opens new channels of communication
and allows people to become more deeply connected with those around
them.
A. Profiling Perils
While the Internet allows for new means of communication, this
flow of information does not travel in isolation. Invisible to most users,
companies use an array of sophisticated software to siphon bits of in-
formation from a user's data stream. Search engines, for example,
account for an enormous proportion of web site visits, and most search
engines keep track of users' search queries.'0 Other companies monitor
when users visit certain web sites and what content they access. The data
are then used to deliver specific ads to targeted individuals. This prac-
tice, known as "behavioral advertising,"" has become so profitable that
Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, and AOL all recently acquired behavioral ad-
vertising firms to increase their profit margins.' 2 Notwithstanding the
rosy picture painted by these financial successes, online profiling raises
8. Internet World Stats, Usage and Population Statistics, http://www.intemetworldstats.
corn/ am/us.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2009).
9. Andrew D. Smith, Most U.S. Workers Use Net on Job, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 20,
2008, http://www.miamiherald.com/business/storyfl3l057.html.
10. See Markham C. Erickson & Kevin Bankston, Should Web Search Data Be
Stored?, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Aug. 15, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/public/article/
SB 115530662685133335-OJwdGqVy4BFV8110 JmjhOxqaoHc_ 20060913.html.
11. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 7.
12. Hotaling, supra note 1, at 539-40 (citing Saul Hansell, Which Advertiser Is on Your
Friend List?, N. Y TIMES, Nov. 2, 2007, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/11/02/which-
advertiser-is-on-your-friend-list).
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concerns because serious harms can happen as these practices become
more invasive and the data collected becomes more personal in nature.
Cookies, 3 for example, are commonplace today because they can
"remember" log-in information, personal preferences, and can be used
for security purposes. 4 But cookies are capable of much more: they can
store, and later transmit, personally identifiable 5 or sensitive informa-
tion. 6 This data could include an individual's name, credit card number,
health condition, social security number, or lifestyle preference. 7
Even if non-personally identifiable information is collected, a com-
pany could match this data (for example, web page visits to research
sexually transmitted diseases) with personally identifiable information
obtained elsewhere (a name, address, or phone number) and sell every-
thing as a package to third parties. When all the data are assembled and
analyzed by powerful computers, each profile can match a user's inter-
ests and personality in frighteningly accurate terms. Meanwhile, the
average user is unaware of what data is collected or how that data will be
used. Cookies are, by design choice and not by coding constraints,
largely invisible to consumers and encrypted to be unintelligible to any
user wanting to know what the cookies are saying about him or her.
Other monitoring methods, such as "web bugs,"' 9 spyware,20 and
email content extraction are capable of gathering more information and
13. Cookies are small text files placed on a user's hard drive by websites.
See HowStuffWorks, What Is an Internet Cookie?, http://www.howstuffworks.com/
question82.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2009).
14. See Reid Goldsborough, The Benefits and Fears of Cookie Technology, NFIB, Jan.
10, 2005, http://www.nfib.com/object/10_19680.html.
15. Personally identifiable information refers to data capable of identifying an individ-
ual, such as a name, address, or social security number. Non-personally identifiable
information does not refer to any specific individual.
16. See Goldsborough, supra note 14.
17. Frederic Debusserd, The EU E-Privacy Directive: A Monstrous Attempt to Starve
the Cookie Monster?, 13 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 70, 77 (2005).
18. Svetlana Milina, Let the Market Do Its Job: Advocating an Integrated Laissez-Faire
Approach to Online Profiling Regulation, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 257, 264 (2003).
19. Web bugs are small pictures, usually one pixel in height by one pixel in length-the
smallest image physically possible. They are designed to be the same color as the background
on which they are placed which renders them essentially invisible. JODIE BERNSTEIN, FED-
ERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ONLINE PROFILING: BENEFITS AND CONCERNS n.27 (2000),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/06/onlineprofile.htm.
20. What Is Spyware or Adware, and How Can I Remove It?, University Information
Technology Services, Indiana University (Oct. 21, 2008), http://kb.iu.edu/data/anfs.html
("Spyware is Internet jargon for any data collection program that secretly gathers information
about you and relays it to advertisers and other interested parties.").
21. See Electronic Privacy Information Center, Gmail Privacy FAQ, http://epic.org/
privacy/gmaillfaq.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2008) (detailing Google's content extraction
policy).
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are harder to detect than cookies.22 In addition, several ISPs have con-
templated tracking user activity using deep packet inspection, 3 which
allows ISPs to sift through email contents, web page visits, VOIP con-
versations, or anything else users do online?' These encroachments seem
even more dangerous because ISPs already have users' billing informa-
tion in their database and could easily combine the data.2
Information gathering techniques have even moved to cell phones.
The Smartphone, for example, can note every email, text message, or
song a user enjoys." Soon, companies may track and record a user's
physical location27 and share all this information over a network of affili-
ated profiling firms. With the current pace of technology, sophisticated
and powerful data gathering tools will likely become even more stealthy
and profitable.
Besides being creepy, these practices bring harmful consequences.
When creating personal profiles, companies often use advanced algo-
rithms to mine user information. These algorithms create inferences
about a user's personality, which are largely based on existing stereo-
types.29 Behavioral advertising then reinforces those stereotypes by
altering consumer behavior through marketing efforts." Besides the ethi-
cal problems raised by reinforcing stereotypes, these practices may
violate personal privacy and compromise personal autonomy because the
consumer has no idea how she has been categorized and may be "in-
duced to act in ways she would not have chosen if she knew about her
profile."'"
22. See Jordan M. Blanke, "Robust Notice" and "Informed Consent:" The Keys to
Successful Spyware Legislation, 7 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 2 (2006).
23. See Saul Hansell, The Mother of All Privacy Battles, N.Y. Ti ms, Mar. 20, 2008,
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03120/the-mother-of-all-privacy-battlesl.
24. See Electronic Privacy Information Center, Deep Packet Inspection and Privacy,
http://epic.org/privacy/dpi/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2008).
25. FTC STATEMENT ON BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, supra note 3, at 13 n.27.
26. John Markoff, You're Leaving a Digital Trail. What About Privacy?, N. Y TiMES,
Nov. 29, 2008, at BUI, available at http://www.nytimes.conm2008/ll/30/business/
30privacy.html (reporting a Smartphone marketing scheme where students exchange personal
information collected via the Smartphone for free phone services).
27. See id.
28. See FTC STATEMENT ON BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, supra note 3, at 2.
29. Nancy J. King, When Mobile Phones Are RFID-Equipped-Finding EU.-U.S. Solu-
tions to Protect Consumer Privacy and Facilitate Mobile Commerce, 15 MICH. TELECOMM.
TECH. L. REV. 107, 145 (2008) (citing Mireille Hildebrandt, Profiling into the Future: An
Assessment of Profiling Technologies in the Context of Ambient Intelligence, I FIDIS J. OF
IDENTITY IN THE INFO. Soc'Y 7 (2007)).
30. Id. at 135.
31. Id. at 146 (citing Mireille Hildebrandt, Profiling into the Future: An Assessment of
Profiling Technologies in the Context of Ambient Intelligence, 1 FIDIS J. OF IDENTITY IN THE
INFO. Soc'Y 7, 9 (2007)).
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In addition, if there is a security breach or a user's profile is mishan-
dled, her data may become publicly available-a problem which is even
graver if her profile contains sensitive information. Trusting corporate
security may not be the wisest idea. Companies currently battle against
increasingly complex security threats as identity thieves develop sophis-
ticated tactics for obtaining private data.32 Acxiom, one of the largest
database companies, provides a particularly alarming example. In 2004,
Scott Levine stole 8.2 gigabytes of information from Acxiom.33 The sto-
len data included names, home addresses, bank accounts, and credit card
information.3
Some companies argue that they protect customers' privacy by col-
lecting only non-personally identifiable information and by making all
data anonymous. However, experience shows that this may not be as safe
as advertised. In 2006, AOL released thousands of anonymous profiles.
From this data, the New York Times was able to identify a specific per-
son, Thelma Arnold, a 62-year-old woman living in Georgia.3"
Perhaps the real harm is loss of consumer control. One scholar noted
that "[t]he more cognizable and immediate problem with a loss of in-
formation privacy ... is our inability to avoid circumstances in which
others control information that can affect us in material ways. 36 Advanc-
ing technology makes it "virtually impossible for a user to keep track of
all of the ways that they can be monitored while surfing the web."37 At
the same time, data collection practices are so pervasive that "there is
almost no way for a user to prevent the collection of their personal in-
formation.' '31 Indeed, Scott McNealy's cold counsel to consumers, "You
have zero privacy anyway. Get over it,"39 has never been truer.
32. Karim Z. Oussayef, Note, Selective Privacy: Facilitating Market-Based Solutions to
Data Breaches by Standardizing Internet Privacy Policies, 14 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 104,
116 (2008).
33. Declan McCullagh, Data Thief Gets Eight Years, ZDNET, Feb. 23, 2006,
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1009_22-146938.html.
34. Verdict Awaited in Hacking Trial, AGE, Aug. 11, 2005, http://www.theage.com.au/
news/breaking/verdict-awaited-in-hacking-trial/2005/08/11/1123353411040.html.
35. Kelly Martin, AOL Search Data Identified Individuals, SECURITY Focus, Aug. 9,
2008, http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/277.
36. James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L.
REV. 1, 26 (2003).
37. David Goldman, I Always Feel Like Someone Is Watching Me: A Technological
Solution for Online Privacy, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 353, 355 (2006).
38. Id.
39. Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: Get over It, WIRED NEWS, Jan. 26, 1999, http://
www.wired.com/news/politics/0, 1283,17538,00.html.
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B.... and Profits
Even though online profiling threatens personal privacy, it also en-
ables many of the opportunities the Internet now offers. Advertising is
one of the principle vehicles for e-commerce,40 with revenues of over
$21 billion in 2007.4' Behavioral advertising is simply more effective
- 42than contextual advertising, and funds many of the websites used today.
The FTC observed that:
[B]ehavioral advertising may help subsidize and support a di-
verse range of free online content and services that otherwise
might not be available or that consumers would otherwise have
to pay for--content and services such as blogging, search en-
gines, social networking, and instant access to newspapers and
information from around the world.43
Targeted ads can also be more enjoyable to the average user, which
may "facilitate shopping for the specific products that consumers
want."" Amazon.com, for example, presents a user with a selection of
recommended items based on that user's prior purchases and searches.45
Using behavioral advertising has helped make Amazon.com a big suc-
cess 46 and Amazon.com recently received a patent on its profiling
system. 7 Other perks of online profiling include customized content,
such as personal web pages, local news and weather, or favorite stock
quotes.
Online profiling can also lower costs by "reducing the risks of ac-
cepting checks and other non-cash payments" 9 and offers "the
unprecedented ability to examine consumer behavior in order to mini-
mize marketing and distribution costs." 0 Simply put, companies can use
40. FTC STATEMENT ON BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, supra note 3, at 4.
41. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, LAB INTERNET ADVERTISING REVENUE REPORT
(2008), http://www.iab.net/media/file/IABPwC_2007_full-year.pdf.
42. Helen Leggatt, Behavioral Advertising Attracts More Consumer Attention, BIzRE-
PORT, Sept. 13, 2007, http://www.bizreport.com/2007/09/behavioral-advertising-attracts-
more_consumer-attention.html.
43. FTC STATEMENT ON BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, supra note 3, at 4.
44. Id. at3.
45. See Amazon.com, Amazon.com Privacy Notice, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/
customer/display.htmlU188-0513236-0619248?ie=UTF8&nodeld=468496 (last visited May
13, 2009).
46. Bob Tedeschi, Gifts.com Doesn't Know Your Aunt Sally. But the Company Is Bet-
ting its Search Engine Can Recommend a Nice Present for Her, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2009, at
CI ("Since Amazon.com is the most popular retail site for gift shoppers-having garnered
nearly 14 percent of all online sales in the fourth quarter of 2004.. ').
47. Id.
48. Milina, supra note 18, at 264.
49. Cate & Staten, supra note 6.
50. Milina, supra note 18, at 261.
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online profiling to offer products that are better and more accurately tai-
lored to consumer demands." Armed with these advantages, a company
"can increase its profit margins while passing valuable savings along to
consumers." 2 Targeted advertising also encourages new competitors,
manifested by a "number of new businesses [that] have sprung up in re-
cent years premised on providing new goods and services to consumers
in exchange for, or in reliance on, information about them." 3
There are also indirect benefits for consumers. Fred Cate and Mi-
chael Staten, academic scholars specializing in privacy law and market
economics, respectively, point out that profiling prevents fraud and cre-
ates an efficient credit market.' Specifically, they note that:
In 1997, 82 percent of automobile loan applicants received a de-
cision within an hour; 48 percent of applicants received a
decision within 30 minutes. In most instances, these decisions
can be made no matter where in the United States the consumer
lives or the request is initiated. Many retailers open new charge
accounts for customers at the point of sale in less than two min-
utes. ...
Thus, Internet users are pulled by opposing concerns. On the one hand,
exciting and profitable endeavors are funded through behavioral adver-
tising. On the other hand, large amounts of potentially sensitive
information are vacuumed up and sold in the open market. Unfortu-
nately, users may not have the ability to decide which behavioral
advertising methods are acceptable and which are not. Because the bene-
fits and burdens of online profiling are so significant and widespread,
this conflict calls for an overarching plan to increase privacy on the
Internet while maintaining an environment conducive to e-commerce.
II. PRIVATE SOLUTIONS
To resolve this dilemma, some scholars argue that privacy should be
enforced through civil litigation by creating a property right in personal
data 6 or by using tort law to remedy harms from exploited information. 7
These proposals offer flexibility by implementing standards on a case by
51. Id.
52. Id. at 262.
53. Kent Walker, Where Everybody Knows Your Name: A Pragmatic Look at the Costs
of Privacy and the Benefits of Information Exchange, 2000 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 2, 9 (2000).
54. Cate & Staten, supra note 6.
55. Id. (citing Consumer Bankers Association, 1998 Automobile Finance Study, at 19).
56. E.g., Mell, supra note 2; Murphy, supra note 2.
57. E.g., Litman, supra note 2.
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case basis. In addition, judicial interpretation could create these rights
instead of legislative action-arguably avoiding "the interference of in-
terest groups, lobbyists, and re-election campaigns."'58 Creating a private
right may force those who want the data to bargain for it and provide
clear disclosure to users.
However, several characteristics of civil litigation make this option
less than ideal. As an initial matter, allowing people to negotiate away
private rights in personal data may legitimatize data collection prac-
tices-an outrageous result for those "who consider information privacy
to be a fundamental civil right."59 Even if this objection is overcome or
ignored, there are several other factors which cast doubt on the efficacy
of a private solution.
First, civil litigation proceeds one case at a time. Deciding conflicts
on a case by case basis may simply be too slow. Individual cases can
take several years to resolve, especially since appellate courts will
probably chime in when expanding the law. This timeframe is out of
sync with the rate of technological developments. By the time courts
limit deep packet inspection, for example, other monitoring methods,
such as the Smartphone, will have stepped into the vacancy. Class action
lawsuits could hasten the process, but judges may be reluctant to certify
classes with privacy injuries because of the "individual nature of the
harm and damages.' 6°
Second, each case will be decided within a specific context and, due
to the complex nature of interactions on the web, many cases may have
to be decided before developing broad protections. Some scholars, in
fact, doubt effective protection could ever result through this process,
61
and believe that "litigation should not be the primary enforcement
mechanism for citizens who can rarely afford to sue ... a large commer-
,,62cial enterprise.
Third, implementing standards on a case by case basis will probably
result in rights that vary in scope across jurisdictions. This is incompati-
ble with a national (if not global) Internet community. While it is
possible for judges in different states to come to a general consensus, the
58. Matthew C. Keck, Cookies, the Constitution, and the Common Law: A Framework
for the Right of Privacy on the Internet, 13 ALB. L.J Sci. & TEcH. 83, 115 (2002). However,
elected judges may still be subject to many of the same political influences.
59. Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1142
(2000).
60. Seth Safier, Between Big Brother and the Bottom Line: Privacy in Cyberspace, 5
VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, 1 108 (2000).
61. See Nehf, supra note 36, at 58-66.
62. Id. at 68 (citing David H. Flaherty, Controlling Surveillance: Can Privacy Protec-
tion Be Made Effective?, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIvACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 167, 174
(Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., MIT Press 1998)).
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more probable scenario is that small but significant differences will exist.
This forces firms to adopt the policy of the most protective region. In
theory, there is nothing wrong with this approach-the strictest policy
might be the best one. But it is more likely that the most protective pol-
icy will be less than ideal because, generally, the more strict the policy,
the greater the dampening effects on e-commerce.63 While privacy con-
cerns may justify some limitations on e-commerce, the "race to the
bottom" described above would effectively ignore e-commerce concerns.
In the end, omitting one side of the debate is unlikely to produce an ideal
solution.
Fourth, forcing companies to individually negotiate with each visitor
to their website, as a means to avoid later litigation, may be too costly. 
6
Profiling works best with aggregation, and requiring each company to
develop the infrastructure to navigate through billions of negotiations
and honor billions of individual requests would be, as one scholar ob-
served, a "bookkeeping nightmare. ' Thus, a private cause of action
would add significant transaction costs to a system designed to function
without them.66 Granting a private cause of action would compel compa-
nies to bear the brunt of a complete system overhaul and would likely
reduce the existing menu of consumer benefits.
Overall, protecting privacy through civil litigation is an attractive
idea, but might be less effective than legislative and regulatory solutions
in protecting personal privacy. In addition, expanding private rights may
pose considerable threats to the economic benefits of online profiling.
Therefore, on the whole, it seems that creating a private right of action
would significantly impair the vibrant e-commerce industry without do-
ing enough to protect personal privacy.
III. SELF-REGULATION AND LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
Since expanding private rights seems unlikely to successfully
balance privacy and e-commerce, a more public solution, such as self-
regulation or legislation, may be appropriate. Unfortunately, the current
form of self-regulation, as described below, does not appear to ade-
quately protect privacy either. Yet self-regulation offers too many
benefits to be completely discarded. Similarly, legislative solutions also
63. See Noel Cox, The Relationship Between Law, Government, Business, and Technol-
ogy, 8 DuQ. Bus. L.J. 31,35 (2006).
64. Samuelson, supra note 59, at 1135.
65. Litman, supra note 2, at 1298.
66. See Samuelson, supra note 59, at 1137.
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promise valuable advantages, but, despite broad support, may not be able
to protect privacy without suffocating e-commerce.
A. Self-Regulation
For at least the last decade, industry self-regulation has operated as
the main mechanism for protecting privacy on the Internet.67 During this
time, hundreds of profitable businesses rapidly grew by using new meth-
ods and technologies. These firms then created many of the benefits
currently enjoyed today. This e-commerce explosion flourished because
companies, both new and established, could efficiently implement inno-
vations under the flexible principles provided by self-regulation.",
Maintaining adaptable standards is important because even more break-
throughs appear to be on the horizon.
Self-regulation works by placing decision-making power on those
closest to the technology and business methods. This protects future op-
portunities better than other approaches because those with actual
experience are more likely to know what innovations are possible than
judges or Congress. Empowering those closest to technology also creates
standards which can respond more quickly to innovation because people
with field experience generally have a better understanding of what has
changed. Without an adaptable solution, regulations may have the unfor-
tunate effect of restricting innovation or channeling research efforts into
existing technology at the expense of presently unforeseen opportuni-
69ties.
While self-regulation seems well-equipped to preserve economic
benefits and open doors to future innovation, the question remains as to
whether it can sufficiently protect personal privacy. On one hand, com-
panies seem to have a strong incentive to protect personal privacy. Even
the implication that a business sells the personal data it collects from
customers could tarnish its goodwill. In fact, "business consulting firms
now routinely encourage the adoption and promotion of privacy policies
67. See FTC STATEMENT ON BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, supra note 3, at 7-10.
68. Id. at 12-13 ("[Slelf-regulation ... affords the flexibility that is needed as business
models continue to evolve.").
69. See Milina, supra note 18, at 272-74; see also AUTOMOTIVE PANEL, NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNSEL, THE COMPETITIVE STATUS OF THE U.S. AUTO INDUSTRY: A STUDY OF
THE INFLUENCES OF TECHNOLOGY IN DETERMINING INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COMPETI-
TIVE ADVANTAGE 86 (Nat'l Acad. Press 1982) ("[T]ightening regulatory requirements forces
companies to divert discretionary resources into programs to improve existing technologies, in
effect entrenching the current technology within the industry.").
70. See James P. Nehf, Shopping for Privacy Online: Consumer Decision-Making
Strategies and the Emerging Market for Information Privacy, 2005 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL'Y 1, 10-11 (2005).
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as a way to present a positive client image."'" Others claim that self-
regulation works because it has already resolved several privacy prob-
lems. For example, in 1999, IBM and others influenced many in the
industry to publish privacy statements.7 " Since then, self-regulation
caused several firms to change their behavioral advertising plans" and
drove others out of the market after public outcries over privacy inva-
sions.74
On the other hand, while companies clearly understand that success
"depend[s] on their ability to allay consumer concerns about security and
privacy,'" today's thriving market rewards companies who collect data
while remaining invisible. This skewed incentive structure inspires firms
to be less transparent and avoid consumer complaints by hiding their
behavior, instead of actually taking measures to ensure adequate protec-
tion.
Privacy policies, for example, appear to manifest greater transpar-
ency but actually reveal very little. These policies are usually
unintelligible, "[flull of 'electronic boilerplate,'" and "often includ[e] a
clause that reserves the company the right to change its user data stan-
dards at any time."76 Unless a person rereads the policy with each visit,
he or she will never know what information that company records.7
These policies also fail to disclose how data will be used, making it im-
possible for users to object to bad practices. Without knowing how data
is collected and sold, poor practices are difficult, if not impossible, to
prohibit.
Even if self-regulation brings greater transparency, relief often
comes only after public outcry. James Nehf, an internationally recog-
nized expert in consumer privacy law, observed that "[r]equiring a public
protest each time a privacy invasion occurs is not an effective privacy
71. Id. at2.
72. See Kim Girard, IBM to Pull Web Ads over Privacy Concerns, CNET NEws, Mar.
31, 1999, http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-223745,html; Nehf, supra note 70, at 3 (noting that
self-regulation functions through informal coordination to protect privacy).
73. See Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 5, at 108-10 (citations omitted) (summariz-
ing changes by Equifax, AOL, CVS, RealNetworks, DoubleClick, and others); see also FrC
STATEMENT ON BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, supra note 3, at 5-6.
74. See Alissa Cooper, Backing Down on Behavioral Advertising, CENTER FOR DEMOC-
RACY AND TECHNOLOGY, Oct. 13, 2008, http:/lblog.cdt.org/2008/10/13/backing-down-on-
behavioral-advertising/ ("NebuAd is currently revisiting its business plans, while Adzilla has
shuttered its North American operations altogether.").
75. Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, Is More Government Regulation Needed to
Promote E-Commerce?, 35 CONN. L. REV. 195, 201 (2002).
76. Hotaling, supra note 1, at 552 (citing Wayne R. Barnes, Rethinking Spyware: Ques-
tioning the Propriety of Contractual Consent to Online Surveillance, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1545, 1604 (2006)).
77. Nehf, supra note 36, at 63.
78. Id. at 62.
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policy. People should not have to start a public relations campaign
whenever a dangerous privacy plan is exposed." 9
This illustrates another problem with self-regulation-little or no
actual enforcement. Meaningful self-regulation must include effective
policing.o While the FTC does treat violations of a company's own
privacy policy as a deceptive business practice,"1 it cannot reach those
who do not voluntarily publish policies. In addition, FTC enforcement
has been "sporadic" at best.82 The FTC currently lists only twenty-five
enforcement actions brought in this area under Section 5 of the FTC
Act.83
Involving independent certification companies, like TRUSTe,'
might solve the enforcement issue. TRUSTe's program certifies web-
sites which conform to TRUSTe's privacy policies. Those websites
which pass the certification process are then authorized to display the
TRUSTe seal. TRUSTe also monitors certified websites to ensure con-
tinuing compliance.85 But to be successful, companies must actually
adopt certification standards. Currently, there is little evidence of wide-
spread implementation. One scholar reports that TRUSTe has certified
only a relatively small number of websites, and that "[a]mong the ten
most popular websites, the majority lacked TRUSTe seals.
86
Even if certification standards are widely adopted, the certification
procedure may suffer from fatal flaws. For example, "the most popular
seal programs do not perform regular and rigorous audits on their cli-
ent's web sites to ensure that the web seal standards are being
satisfied."' These defects may ultimately result in greater harm if users
release more personal information under the expectation that the com-
pany offers robust privacy protection.
79. Id.
80. See Joe Mandese, Online Privacy: JAB Pushes for Self-Reg, MEDIAPOST NEWS,
Sept. 22, 2008, http://www.mediapost.com/publications/?fa=Articles.showArticleHomePage&
artaid=91078 (quoting Eileen Harrington, then Deputy Director (now Acting Director) of the
Bureau for Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission).
81. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006) (prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts or practices).
82. Marcy E. Peek, Information Privacy and Corporate Power: Towards a Re-
Imagination of Information Privacy Law, 37 SETON HALL L. REv. 127, 156 (2006).
83. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY INITIATIVES, http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/
privacyinitiatives/promisesenf.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
84. TRUSTE, http://truste.org (last visited Mar. 17, 2009).
85. TRUSTE, TRUSTE PROGRAM SHEET, http://www.truste.org/pdfITRUSTe-
ProgramsSheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2009).
86. Oussayef, supra note 32, at 128 (citations omitted).
87. Nehf, supra note 36, at 65.
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In addition, some argue that data breaches are proof that
self-regulation will never work." Once data is stolen or released, it can
be sold and resold quickly, making it nearly impossible to trace the
information back to the original leak. This prohibits accountability
when specific injuries occur. "Without accountability, market forces
cannot effectively curb harmful behavior."89
The successes of self-regulation are ultimately limited both in
number and scope. While some scholars plead for more time before
passing judgment, 90 it seems that self-regulation does not, and likely
will not, do enough to protect personal privacy. The incentive structure
supporting self-regulation seems to have at least two major problems:
misguided incentives and ineffective policing. Self-regulation offers
great promise for future innovation and a vibrant Internet industry. But,
overall, this promise is not enough to outweigh its failure to protect
personal privacy.
B. Legislation
The apparent failure of self-regulation to address privacy problems
has caused many to turn to Congress for a solution. Enacting regulation
through a federal statute can provide a nationwide standard, robust pri-
vacy protection, and a timely solution. In addition, legislative solutions
have the ability to clearly identify acceptable practices, which can
lower legal uncertainty and enable greater investment.
However, some claim that legislation will never pass, either be-
cause Congress lacks political consensus or because the online
advertising industry has too much lobbying influence.9' Whether or not
this was true in the past, the specter raised by the possibility of ISP
surveillance seems to have sparked a flurry of action in Congress. On
May 16, 2008, Representatives Edward Markey and Joe Barton wrote
to Charter Communications, an ISP, and asked it to postpone plans to
track user activity.9 Later, on August 1, John Dingell, Joe Barton, Ed-
ward Markey, and Cliff Steams, on behalf of the U.S. House of
Representatives' Committee on Commerce and Energy, wrote a letter
88. See Marcey L. Grigsby, Book Note, Seeking Privacy: Examining a Role for the
Fiduciary in Protecting Personal Information, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1031, 1035-36 (2005)
(reviewing DANIEL SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE IN-
FORMATION AGE (2004)).
89. Nehf, supra note 36, at 65.
90. Milina, supra note 18, at 284-85.
91. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 2, at 1287.
92. Letter from Edward Markey and Joe Barton, Representatives of MA and TX respec-
tively, to Neil Smit, President and CEO, Charter Communications (May 16, 2008), available
at http://markey.house.gov/docs/telecomm/letter-charter_comm_privacy.pdf.
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to 33 network operators, asking them to explain their current and future
policies regarding data collection practices.93
In the Senate, on September 25, 2008, the Committee on Com-
merce, Science, and Communication held a hearing on Broadband
Providers and Consumer Privacy.
94 There, representatives from AT&T,
95
Time Warner, 96 Verizon, 97 and Public Knowledge, 98 a Washington,
DC-based public interest group,99 addressed the Committee to identify
concerns about online profiling by ISPs.
These recent events indicate that there may be enough political
momentum and excitement over privacy concerns that a new law may be
forthcoming. Specifically, Representative Barton, the ranking Republican
on the House Energy and Commerce Committee stated "[a] broad
approach to protecting people's online privacy seems both desirable and
inevitable."''m Others predict that the change in political control will result
in legislative action.'0 ' Meanwhile, individual states, such as New York,
Connecticut, and Massachusetts, have already begun work on enacting
their own laws to protect consumer privacy.' 2
In addition, concerns about legislation dying at the hands of
industry lobbying may have diminished. Many of the top Internet
entities, such as Google,03 Microsoft,'0 and the Interactive Advertising
93. Letter from John Dingell, Joe Barton, Edward Markey, and Cliff Steams, Represen-
tatives of MI, TX, MA, and FL respectively, to 33 Network Operators (August 1, 2008),
available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press-I 10/1 10-tr.080108.AOL-TILetters.pdf.
94. Broadband Providers and Consumer Privacy: Hearings before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Communication, 110th Cong. (2008), available at http:Il
commerce.senate.gov/publicfindex.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing-D=-778594fe-
a171-4906-a585-15fl9e2d602a.
95. Id. (statement of Dorothy Attwood, Senior Vice President, Public Policy, & Chief
Privacy Officer, AT&T, Inc.), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/public/_files/
AttwoodTestimony.pdf.
96. Id. (statement of Peter Stem, Executive Vice President, Chief Strategy Officer, Time
Warner Cable), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/public/-files/PeterStemTestimony.pdf.
97. Id. (statement of Thomas J. Tauke, Executive Vice President of Verizon), available
at http://commerce.senate.gov/public/files/ThomasTaukeTestimony.pdf.
98. Id. (statement of Gigi B. Sohn, President, Public Knowledge), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/public/_- files/SohnTestimony.pdf.
99. Public Knowledge, http://www.pubicknowledge.org (last visited Nov. 18, 2008).
100. David Kaplan, Google, Others Discuss Their Ad Targeting Secrets; Push for Legis-
lation Is "Bipartisan", PAIDCONTENT.ORG, Aug. 12, 2008, http://www.paidcontent.org/
entry/419-google-others-discuss-their-ad-targeting-secrets-push-for-legislation.
101. Hotaling, supra note 1, at 562.
102. Dominique R. Shelton, Online Behavioral Advertising-Key to Internet Monetiza-
tion or Privacy Probes?, PRIVACY & INFO. L. REP., July-Aug. 2008, at 12, available at
http://privacylaw.wildman.com/article/OnlineBehavioral-Advertising.pdf.
103. Letter from Google to the House Energy and Commerce Committee (Aug. 8, 2008),
available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press-110/Responses%20to%20080108%20
TI%20Letter/ 110-1tr.080108responseGoogle.pdf.
104. See Shelton, supra note 102.
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Bureau,0 5 have recognized the value of a legislative solution and, to
varying degrees, support such a proposal.
While a legislative solution may be inevitable, whether it can suffi-
ciently protect privacy and preserve e-commerce remains uncertain.
Legislation ultimately entails line drawing by those who are removed
from the actual technology.'O This hinders Congress' ability to create
accurate and successful solutions.' Precision is important in this situa-
tion because an under-inclusive law may cement poor practices and
neglect privacy altogether. At the same time an over-inclusive law brings
high compliance costs that could "cripple... development and hurt con-
sumers in the long run."' A poorly drafted law may also entrench and
ultimately limit technological developments. '9 Given e-commerce's
complete dependence on technology, "the worst thing a company might
hear a person say is, 'We are from the government. We are here to
help.' "110
Congress can hold hearings to become better informed, but hearings
probably will not provide legislators with the same level of knowledge
about, for example, computers and informational systems that those
practicing in the field have already acquired through experience."' Con-
gressional hearings often involve carefully worded speeches which
might not accurately reflect current practices or future intentions."2 Such
testimonies may be less helpful than actual experience for forming spe-
cific policies.
Moreover, legislative line drawing causes problems in and of itself.
Precise boundaries are nearly impossible to fix around online interac-
105. Renee Boucher Ferguson, A Battle Is Brewing over Online Behavioral Advertising,
EWEEK.COM, March 27, 2008, http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Enterprise-Applications/A-Battle-Is-
Brewing-Over-Online-Behavioral-Advertising-Market.
106. Nehf, supra note 36, at 58 ("One of the problems with privacy laws and regulations
is that they are usually written by policy makers who lack thorough knowledge about the op-
eration of computers and information systems.").
107. See Nehf, supra note 70, at 43 ("Efficiency determinations are difficult to make
legislatively.").
108. Milina, supra note 18, at 272-74.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing Fernando Piera, International Electronic Commerce: Legal Framework at
the Beginning of the XXI Century, 10 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 8 (2001)).
111. Nehf, supra note 36, at 58 ("One of the problems with privacy laws and regulations
is that they are usually written by policy makers who lack thorough knowledge about the op-
eration of computers and information systems.").
112. For recent reports of allegedly misleading or ambiguous congressional testimony,
see Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Gonzales: "Mistakes Were Made", WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2007,
at AO1; Roy Mark, Yahoo Counsel Denies Misleading House Committee, EWEEK.COM, Nov. 3,
2007, http://www.eweek.com/c/a/IT-InfrastructurelYahoo-Counsel-Denies-Misleading-House-
Committee/; Wallace Matthews, Long, Misleading Clemens Report to Bore Congress, NEWS-
DAY (New York), Jan. 29, 2008, at A53.
Legislation for Effective Self-Regulation
tions because they are so varied and complex."' Even if drawn per-
fectly-an unlikely scenario-these lines will only work on existing
practices. The next wave of innovations in technology and business
methods quickly changing clarity into confusion.
In summary, the current political atmosphere suggests that there may
be widespread support for a legislative remedy."4 Unfortunately, the limi-
tations inherent in a typical legislative solution restrict it from adequately
addressing interests of both privacy and e-commerce. Notwithstanding
these problems, the legislative process has the potential to produce an
ideal regulatory scheme if it is modified to become better informed and
flexible--characteristics best found in self-regulation. As one scholar ob-
served, "a flexible approach that combines market forces, industry efforts,
and law enforcement is far superior to broad legislation in addressing con-
sumer concerns about online profiling, while simultaneously preserving its
unprecedented benefits." "' By incorporating characteristics of self-
regulation, a modified legislative solution can protect both personal
privacy and the opportunities enabled by online profiling.
IV. A MODIFIED SOLUTION
As discussed above, self-regulation provides flexibility and commer-
cial success but seems to suffer from a poor incentive structure and
inadequate enforcement. Legislation can provide enforcement and man-
date nation-wide policies, but Congress may be too far removed from
actual technology and business practices to draft a law sharp enough to
cut away privacy harms without slicing into the benefits of online profil-
ing. A modified legislative approach, as explained below, can leverage
existing political momentum to protect personal privacy without stifling
Internet-based industry.
Under this approach, Congress first announces its intention to enact
a law protecting online privacy and provides a set time period (say, one
year) in which companies can voluntarily implement privacy policies.
Then, at the end of the year, companies can submit their policies with
related data to Congress. After reviewing the various schemes, Congress
113. See Nehf, supra note 70, at 43-44 ("Although the deliberative process allows for
many factors to be considered, ex ante mandatory terms are difficult to tailor precisely to spe-
cific contextual situations.... Privacy practices and online interactions between consumers
and firms are varied and complex.").
114. See supra notes 92-105 and accompanying text.
115. Milina, supra note 18, at 286.
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selects the policy which best protects privacy, and implements that stan-
dard as a baseline across the nation."
6
Those companies which fall below this standard will have to modify
their practices to conform to the new law. This, in effect, gives a head
start for the winning company who can then acquire network effects and
short term gains. These rewards act as incentives to encourage participa-
tion.
During the year-long window, companies are likely to compete with
each other on privacy standards, since only the best policy wins the
prize. Another advantage is that these rewards grow with greater privacy
protection. The higher the privacy bar set by the winning company, the
greater its windfall as other firms will have to make larger investments
(with greater delays) to implement the new legal standard.
This approach improves the legislative process by enabling Congress
to enact a law based on transparent records, rather than merely relying
on edited testimony. Looking at established policies and observed facts
removes much of the vagueness associated with simple hearings. In fact,
this process creates incentives for firms not just to appear good before
Congress and consumers, but to actually be good. Firms can enjoy the
victor's spoils only if they fully disclose their practices and intentions.
Those who try to win while obscuring their data collection practices will
lose their head start because they too will eventually have to conform to
the new, higher standard.
In addition, each company has a long-term, vested interest in pre-
serving a vibrant e-commerce industry. Profiling firms are unlikely to
implement privacy policies that create unprofitable business models. By
choosing from a number of industry-implemented options, the privacy
baseline enacted by Congress is less likely to suffocate e-commerce and
eliminate the positive dividends of online profiling.
There are, of course, several drawbacks to this plan. For example,
anti-competitive behavior is always an issue when allowing firms to set
standards for their own industry. This risk may be higher here because
the increased transparency and cooperation may facilitate the formation
and perpetuation of an anti-competitive agreement. Overall, however,
open disclosure will likely help curb anti-competitive behavior by allow-
116. The idea of comparing various approaches to a problem has been implemented in
many situations. One famous example is Justice Brandeis' dissent: "[A] single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic ex-
periments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Current scholars interpret this statement as "saying
that state experimentation produces beneficial knowledge, and that states should therefore be
permitted and encouraged to experiment to the greatest possible extent." James A. Gardner,
The New Judicial Federalism: A New Generation Symposium Issue: The "States-as-
Laboratories" Metaphor in State Constitutional Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 475, 478 (1996).
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ing regulators greater insight into which activities are for privacy regula-
tion, and which activities are agreements for other purposes.
One specific worry is that competitors will combine and agree to
keep all standards low so that Congress is forced to adapt a poor policy.
However, such an agreement would require cooperation by hundreds of
companies and is therefore unlikely to succeed due to coordination diffi-
culties and the ever-present desire of individual firms to cheat on a
collusive agreement." 7 Additionally, Congress could also indicate that it
will implement a strict privacy regime unless sufficient standards are
provided through the competition process.
Moreover, any agreement to keep standards low may merely prompt
new companies, such as ISPs, to enter the advertising market with a
higher privacy standard. A low industry standard creates a high incentive
for a company to step in, take the positive publicity of setting the most
protective policy, and quickly gobble up market share from existing
companies. A concerted arrangement could attempt to include all poten-
tial entrants, such as ISPs, but the logistics of successfully identifying
and incorporating every potential entrant into an agreement makes this
scenario improbable.
However, allowing Congress such flexibility in choosing a solution
may result in a choice based more on lobbying efforts than privacy pro-
tection. One critique of legislative involvement is that it "may result in a
framework that entrenches the interests of the major Internet companies
that can muster influence in Washington.""'8
Nevertheless, under the proposed plan, Congressional decisions are
based on actual practices with observed data-sources more objective
than mere testimony. This may remove some of the wiggle room that
lobbyists exploit, and is likely to result in greater accountability to the
public overall. This scenario makes lobbying dollars less influential and
could increase participation by opening the door for smaller companies
to get a jump on large corporations. While there are valid concerns about
allowing Congress to pick a winner in any situation, the increased trans-
parency and accountability under this plan may mitigate these problems.
Another concern is that legislation can be too inflexible to deal with
evolving technology. Setting baselines, even ones based on actual
practices, still requires line-drawing and may entrench existing
technology. To avoid these problems, Congress can give the FTC authority
to create and maintain a safe harbor, whose boundaries are initially formed
by the best practices selected by Congress. The FTC would then evaluate
117. See Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, & Antitrust, 82 T'Ex. L. REv. 515, 557-62
(2004).
118. Nehf, supra note 70, at 42.
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industry standards on a regular basis and modify the safe harbor
provisions to include the best industry practices across various
technologies. Besides incorporating the benefits of privacy competition
mentioned above, a safe harbor provision maintained by the FIC can
provide evolving privacy standards and allow for long-term competition
on privacy terms. Overall, this solution offers the flexibility needed to
adequately protect privacy and e-commerce. " 9
Unfortunately, the transparency associated with this proposal may be
its greatest weakness as well as its greatest strength. Wide disclosure to
the public means competitors can access the information too. For exam-
ple, a company that implements a protective policy may see others
quickly follow to eliminate any head start the modified policy could
give. Worse still, a company might anticipate this behavior and not move
in the first place. Nevertheless, even if there is no market-based reward,
there are still important incentives to motivate companies to compete.
One reward is to have a federal statute proclaiming that your privacy pol-
icy is the best and completely legal. This will bring significant positive
publicity as well as removing uncertainty for investors.
Overall, this modified solution is attractive because it combines the
benefits of legislation, such as a nationwide standard, governmental en-
forcement, and a timely solution, with the flexibility and industry
knowledge found in self-regulatory solutions. In addition, this approach
brings greater transparency and adapts the incentive structure to encour-
age firms to compete on privacy grounds. By implementing this solution,
Congress can capitalize on the current political momentum and properly
address the privacy problems without destroying the benefits of online
profiling.
CONCLUSION
Online profiling offers consumers unprecedented benefits but also
poses disturbing threats to personal privacy. Efforts to address privacy
problems should be carefully tailored to avoid suffocating a thriving e-
commerce community. Unfortunately, current suggestions for reform
tend to favor privacy at the expense of e-commerce or are unlikely to
protect privacy in any meaningful way. Meanwhile, privacy concerns
appear to be serious enough to muster broad political support for a legis-
lative remedy, despite the defects associated with traditional legislation.
119. See id. at 54 ("Compared to a broad-based legislative approach, the ebb and flow of
an incremental, evolutionary process is less likely to set inefficient norms in stone, and ad-
justments can be made over time as businesses obtain and manipulate personal information in
increasingly sophisticated ways.").
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Congress can capitalize on the existing political momentum and ad-
vance the interests of both privacy and e-commerce by enacting a
legislative scheme which incorporates aspects of self-regulation. This
modified approach creates incentives for companies to compete on pri-
vacy grounds by implementing the most protective policy into a legally
enforceable baseline. In addition, Congress can give authority to the
FTC to maintain a safe harbor whose boundaries are formed through a
similar competitive process.
This proposed solution is ideal because it allows society to harvest
the rewards of online profiling and skirt the privacy pitfalls present in the
practice today. It significantly improves the legislative approach by ena-
bling greater transparency and by empowering those closest to
technology to draft legal standards. This approach also creates flexible
regulation that can better respond to evolving technologies then the typi-
cal legislative process. By combining the benefits of legislation and self-
regulation, this solution includes the characteristics necessary to ensure
both personal privacy and a thriving e-commerce community.
